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This paper is written as a 'half-century' homage to two of the most important contributions to 
economic theory and mathematical economics: Negishi (1960) and Uzawa (1962). The 
former celebrated its Golden Jubilee last year; the latter will do so next year. Almost nothing 
in computable general equilibrium theory, and its many and varied applied variants, would be 
possible without the results in these two classics. 
 Abstract
Takashi Negishi￿ s remarkable youthful contribution to welfare economics,
general equilibrium theory and, with the bene￿t of hindsight, also to one strand
of computable general equilibrium theory, all within the span of six pages in
one article, has become one of the modern classics of general equilibrium theory
and mathematical economics. Negishi￿ s celebrated theorem and what has been
called Negishi￿ s Method have formed one foundation for computable general
equilibrium theory. In this paper I investigate the computable and constructive
aspects of the theorem and the method.
JEL Codes: C63, C68, D58, D60
Key Words: Computable General Equilibrium, Fundamental Theorems of
Welfare Economics, Negishi￿ s Method
21 Introduction and Motivation
David Luenberger￿ s pithy characterisation of the de￿ning achievements of post-
war mathematical general equilbrium theory re￿ ects, I believe uncontroversially,
the general consensus among economic theorists of all shades of opinion:
"The most remarkable achievements of modern microeconomic
theory are the proof of the existence of an equilibrium and the First
and Second Theorems of Welfare Economics which establish the re-
lation between equilibria and Pareto e¢ ciency. These results show
that the structure of microeconomics has a desirable self-consistency,
and they show that this structure can fruitfully address signi￿cant
economic issues. Understandably, therefore, there has been much
attention devoted to various alternative proofs, and extensions of
these basic results."
Luenberger (1994), p. 147; italics added.
I have, myself, tended to refer to these three celebrated achievements as
the crown jewels of mathematical general equilibrium theory. The two kinds of
mathematical theorems that underpin the method of proofs used in demonstrat-
ing these three results, to which I refer as the pearls of mathematical economics,
are the ￿x point theorems of Brouwer (1910) and Kakutani (1941), on the one
hand, and the separating hyperplane theorems ￿in particular the Hahn-Banach
Theorem (cf. Debreu, 1984, in particular, p. 269) ￿on the other.
Negishi￿ s theorem1 and the method of proof used in deriving the theorem
are two of the fundamental contributions to the further theoretical and applied
development of the crown jewels of mathematical equilibrium theory (Negishi,
1960). Negishi himself had the following re￿ ection, more than thirty years later,
on the method of proof used in Negishi (1960):
"The method of proof used in this essay [i.e., in Negishi (1960)] has
been found useful also for such problems as equilibrium in in￿nite
dimensional space and computation of equilibria."
Negishi (1994), p. xiv; italics added."
My aim in this paper is the narrow one of studying the computability and
constructive theoretic properties of Negishi￿ s theorem and, hence, the methods
of proof utilised in them. The reasons for this particular focus of investigation
is easily stated. In an early and important contribution to a study of Negishi￿ s
Theorem, Diewert made the important observation:
"If general equilibrium analysis is to become a useful tool in the
construction of macroeconomic models, e⁄ective algorithms must
1There are actually ￿ve theorems in Negishi (1960). I shall concentrate on Theorem 2
(ibid, p.5), which (I think) is the most important one and the one that came to play the
important role justly attributed to it via the Negishi Research Program outlined by Young
(2008).
3be developed in order to compute general equilibrium. ... Scarf ...
has constructed an algorithm which will ￿nd a ￿xed point ... ."
Diewert, 1973, p. 119; bold italics added.
This may be juxtaposed and read together with the claims of Shoven and
Whalley on the achievements of Scarf￿ s algorithm:
"The major result of postwar mathematical general equilibrium
theory has been to demonstrate the existence of such an equilibrium
by showing the applicability of mathematical ￿xed point theorems
to economic models. ... Since applying general equilibrium models
to policy issues involves computing equilibria, these ￿xed point theo-
rems are important: It is essential to know that an equilibrium exists
for a given model before attempting to compute that equilibrium.
.....
...
The weakness of such applications is twofold. First, they provide
non-constructive rather than constructive proofs of the existence of
equilibrium; that is, they show that equilibria exist but do not pro-
vide techniques by which equilibria can actually be determined. Sec-
ond, existence per se has no policy signi￿cance. .... Thus, ￿xed point
theorems are only relevant in testing the logical consistency of mod-
els prior to the models￿use in comparative static policy analysis;
such theorems do not provide insights as to how economic behavior
will actually change when policies change. They can only be em-
ployed in this way if they can be made constructive (i.e., be used to
￿nd actual equilibria). The extension of the Brouwer and Kakutani
￿xed point theorems in this direction is what underlies the work of
Scarf .... on ￿xed point algorithms ...."
Shoven & Whalley (1992), 12, 20-1; italics added
Diewert￿ s desidaratum on ￿ e⁄ective algorithms￿can only be given content,
formally, in terms of computability theory; Shoven and Whalley, on the other
hand, claim ￿ explicitly ￿ that Scarf￿ s work on ￿ ￿xed point algorithms￿ are
constructive (in the strict mathematical sense). In a recent series of papers
on these issues I have demonstrated that the ￿rst desidaratum is impossible to
achieve and the second claims are incorrect (cf., Velupillai, 2006, 2009).
Scarf, however, was much more measured in his claims of what he had
achieved:
"In applying the algorithm it is, in general, impossible to select
an ever ￿ner sequence of grids and a convergent sequence of sub-
simplices. An algorithm for a digital computer must be basically
￿nite and cannot involve an in￿nite sequence of successive re￿ne-
ments. ....... The passage to the limit is the nonconstructive aspect
of Brouwer￿ s theorem, and we have no assurance that the subsimplex
4determined by a ￿ne grid of vectors on S contains or is even close
to a true ￿xed point of the mapping."
Scarf (1973), p.52; italics added
To the best of my knowledge, no one has investigated the exact content of
Negishi￿ s Theorem or his Method(s) of Proof from either computable or con-
structive points of view. This is the main reason for the aims of this paper.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section a brief background
discussion of the economic theoretic basis of the theorem is outlined, with some
minor clairi￿cations and explanations.
2 Background Clari￿cations
What exactly was Negishi￿ s method of proof and how did it contribute to the
computation of equilibria?
A characterisation of the di⁄erence between the standard approach to prov-
ing the existence of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, and its computation by a
t￿tonnement procedure ￿i.e., algorithm ￿of a mapping from the price simplex
to itself, and the alternative Negishi method of iterating the weights assigned to
individual utility functions that go into the de￿nition of a social welfare function
which is maximised to determine ￿i.e., compute ￿the equilibrium, captures
the key innovative aspect of the latter approach. Essentially, therefore, the dif-
ference between the standard approach to the proof of existence of equilibrium
Arrow-Debreu prices, and their computation, and the Negishi approach boils
down to the following:
￿ The standard approach proves the existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
prices by an appeal to a ￿xed point theorem and computes them ￿the
equilibrium prices ￿by invoking the Uzawa equivalence theorem (Uzawa,
1962) and devising an algorithm for the excess demand functions that map
a price simplex into itself to determine the ￿xed point (Scarf, 1973).
￿ The Negishi approach proves, given initial endowments, the existence of
individual welfare weights de￿ning a social welfare function, whose maxi-
mization (subject to the usual constraints) determines the identical Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium. The standard mapping of excess demand functions,
mapping a price simplex into itself to determine a ￿xed point, is replaced
by a mapping from the space of utility weights into itself, appealing to the
same kind of ￿xed point theorem (in this case, the Kakutani ￿xed point
theorem) to prove the existence of equilibrium prices.
￿ In other words, the method of proof of existence of equilibrium prices in
the one approach is replaced by the proof of existence of ￿ equilibrium util-
ity weights￿ , both appealing to traditional ￿xed point theorems (Brouwer,
1910, von Neumann, 1937, and Kakutani, 1941).
5￿ In both cases, the computation of equilibrium prices on the one hand
and, on the other, the computation of equilibrium weights, algorithms are
devised that are claimed to determine (even if only approximately) the
same ￿xed points.
Before proceeding any further, I should add that I am in the happy position
of being able to refer the interested reader to a scholarly survey of Negishi￿ s
work. Takashi Negishi￿ s outstanding ￿ contributions to economic analysis￿are
brilliantly and comprehensively surveyed by Warren Young in his recent paper
(Young, 2008). Young￿ s paper provides a particularly appropriate background
to the issues I tackle here. It ￿Young￿ s paper ￿is especially relevant also because
his elegant summary of Negishi￿ s ￿ contribution to economic analysis￿identi￿es
Negishi (1960) as one of the two crucial pillars2 on which to tell a coherent and
persuasive story of what he calls the Negishi ￿ research program￿(ibid, p. 162;
second set of italics, added):
"To sum up, a number of major research programs can be identi-
￿ed, therefore, as emanating from Negishi￿ s now classic papers, that
of [Negishi, 1960] and [Negishi 1961], respectively. Negishi￿ s 1960
paper forms the basis for both ￿ theoretical￿and ￿ applied￿research
programs in general equilibrium analysis, and his 1961 paper ... has
been almost as in￿uential in demarcating ongoing research up to the
present in the ￿eld of imperfect competition and non-tatonnement
processes. These papers ... attest to Negishi￿ s considerable in￿ uence
on the development of modern economic theory and analysis."
However, as mentioned above, no one ￿ to the best of my knowledge ￿
has studied Negishi￿ s method of proof from the point of view of constructivity
and computability. Young￿ s perceptive - and, in my opinion, entirely correct
- identi￿cation of the crucial role played by Negishi (1960) in ￿ both "theoreti-
cal" and "applied" research program in general equilibrium analysis￿is, in fact,
about methods of existence proofs and computable general equilibrium (CGE),
and its o⁄shoots, in the form of applied computable general equilibrium analysis
ACGE) ￿even leading up to current frontiers in computational issues in Dy-
namic Stochastic General Equilibrium models (cf., Judd (2005), pp. 52-57, for
example).
Before I turn to these issues of the constructivity and computability of
Negishi￿ s method of existence proofs and the underpinning of some aspects
computation in CGE and ACGE models in Negishi￿ s approach (rather than,
for example, in the standard approach pioneered by Scarf, 1973), there is one
important economic theoretic confusion that needs to be sorted out. This is the
question of the role played by the fundamental theorems of welfare economics
in Negishi￿ s method of the proof of the existence of a general (Walrasian) equi-
librium.
2The other one being Negishi (1961). I am in full agreement with Young￿ s important
observation that it is Negishi (1960) that is more important, which is why I have added italics
to the phrase ￿ almost as in￿uential￿ , in the above quote.
6It is generally agreed that the Negishi method of existence proof is an applica-
tions of ￿xed point theorems on the utility simplex, in contrast to the ￿ standard￿
way of applying such theorems to the price simplex (cf., Cheng 1991, p. 138,
and above). This fact has generated a remarkable confusion on the question of
which fundamental theorem of welfare economics underpins the Negishi method!
For a method that has been around for over half a century, it is somewhat
disheartening to note that frontier research and researchers seem still to be con-
fused on which of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics is relevant
in Negishi￿ s method. Thus, we ￿nd Judd, as recently as only a few years ago
(op.cit, pp. 52-3) claiming, unreservedly, that (italics added):
"The Negishi method exploits the ￿rst theorem of welfare economics,
which states that any competitive equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu
model is Pareto e¢ cient."
On the other hand, Warren Young (op.cit, p.152; italics added) equally
con￿dentially stating that:
In his pioneering 1960 paper, Negishi provided a completely new
way of proving the existence of equilibrium, via the Second Welfare
Theorem. He established equivalence between the equilibrium prob-
lem set out by Arrow-Debreu and what has been called ￿ mathemati-
cal programming￿ , thereby developing a ￿ method￿that has been used
with much success by later economists working in both theoretical
and applied general equilibrium modelling ... ."
Fortunately, Negishi himself returned to a discussion of the ￿ Negishi method,
or Negishi approach￿more recently (Negishi, 2008, p. 168) and may have helped
sort out this conundrum (ibid, p. 167; italics added):
"The so-called Negishi method, or Negishi approach, has often
been used in studies of dynamic in￿nite-dimensional general equi-
librium theory, and the numerical computation of such equilibria ...
. This method is an application of the Negishi theorem (Negishi,
1960), which demonstrates the existence of a general equilibrium us-
ing the ￿rst theorem of welfare economics, which states that any com-
petitive equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu model is Pareto e¢ cient. In
other words, a general equilibrium of a competitive economy is con-
sidered as the maximization of a kind of social welfare function (i.e.,
the properly weighted sum of individual utilities), where the weights
are inversely proportional to the marginal utility of income."
Negishi is one of those rare economists who is both a scholar of the history
of economic theory and one of the most competent general equilibrium theorists
and ￿even if he had not been the originator of the Negishi method ￿one may
feel forced to reject Warren Young￿ s claim3!
3The puzzle here is that the Young and Negishi articles appear ￿ back-to-back￿ , in the same
issue of the International Journal of Economic Theory and the two distinguished authors
thank each other handsomely in their respective acknowledgements!
7As a matter of fact, from a constructivist and recursion theoretic point of
view, this conundrum is a non-problem for several reasons. First of all, both
fundamental theorems of welfare economics are provably non-constructive and
lead to uncomputable equilibria. Secondly, all ￿to the best of my knowledge ￿of
the current algorithms utilised in CGE, ACGE and DSGE modelling appeal to
undecidable disjunctions ￿essentially by an appeal to the Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem - and are e⁄ectively meaningless from computable and constructive
points of view. Thirdly, and most importantly, Negishi￿ s theorem(s) are, them-
selves, proved nonconstructively ￿the issue(s) to which I now turn.
3 Nonconstructive and Uncomputable aspect of
Negishi￿ s Theorem and the Negishi Method
A brief preamble on why the Brouwer ￿x point theorem, which lies at the basis
of the proofs of both Kakutani￿ s theorem and Slater￿ s results (see below) may
make the content of this section reasonably self-contained. Before I do provide
the ￿ brief preamble￿it may also be useful to begin it with the following important
observation by Brouwer himself:
"This is a specimen of intuitionist reasoning in topology, and
in particular an illustration of the consequences of the invalidity
of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem in intuitionism, for the validity
of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem would make the classical and
intuitionist forms of the ￿xed-point theorms equivalent."
Brouwer (1952), p. 1; italics added.
Brouwer, in the above quote, is ￿of course ￿referring to his celebrated ￿xed-
point theorem, widely used in mathematical economics in its original form, or
in one or another of its ￿ generalizations￿ , by Kakutani, Knaster-Kuratwoski-
Mazurkiewicz (KKM), etc. On the other hand, just because a ￿xed-point the-
orem is invalid from an intuitionistic point of view4 does not necessarily mean
that it is non-constructive or uncomputable from mathematical points of view
claiming allegiance to other forms of constructivism and varieties of computabil-
ity theories. The point here, however, is the role of the Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem and its intrinsic undecidable disjunctions, which make any theorem in-
voking it in its proof fundamentally non-constructive and uncomputable from
any (known) mathematical point of view.
An algorithm, by de￿nition, is a ￿nite object, consisting of a ￿nite sequence
of instructions. Just being a ￿nite object does not automatically make it e⁄ec-
tive. Any one of the ￿nite sequence of instructions has the potential to invoke
undecidable disjunctions, as in Scarf￿ s algorithm. However, such a ￿nite ob-
ject is perfectly compatible with ￿ an in￿nite sequence of successive re￿nements￿
4We are ￿ advised￿ , in a recent advanced textbook in Real Analysis with Economic
Applications (Ok, 2007, p. 279, footnote 47), ￿ If [we] want to learn about intuitionism
in mathematics￿ , to do so ￿ in [our] spare time, please￿! The footnote in which this ￿ advice￿
appears contains elementary mathematical and biographical errors (on Brouwer).
8(Scarf, 1973, p. 52), provided a stopping rule associated with a clearly speci￿ed
and veri￿able approximation value is part of the sequence of instructions that
characterize the algorithm. Moreover, it is not ￿ the passage to the limit [that]
is the nonconstructive aspect of Brouwer￿ s [￿x point] theorem￿(ibid, p.52)5. In-
stead, the sources of non-constructivity are the undecidable disjunctions - i.e.,
appeal to the law of the excluded middle in in￿nitary instances - intrinsic to
the choice of a convergent subsequence in the use of the Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem6 and an appeal to the law of double negation in an in￿nitary instance
during a retraction. The latter reliance invalidates the proof in the eyes of the
Brouwerian constructivists; the former makes it constructively invalid from the
point of view of every school of constructivism, whether they accept or deny
intuitionistic logic.
Brouwer￿ s proof of his celebrated ￿x point theorem was indirect in two ways:
he proved, ￿rst, the following:
Theorem 1 Given a continuous map of the disk onto itself with no ￿xed points,
9 a continuous retraction of the disk to its boundary.
Having proved this, he then took its contrapositive:
Theorem 2 If there is no continuous retraction of the disk to its boundary then
there is no continuous map of the disk to itself without a ￿xed point.
Using the logical principle of equivalence between a proposition and its con-
trapositive (i.e., logical equivalence between theorems 1 & 2) and the law of
double negation (@ a continuous map with no ￿xed point = 9 a continuous map
with a ￿xed point) Brouwer demonstrated the existence of a ￿xed point for a
continuous map of the disk to itself. This latter principle is what makes the
proof of the Brouwer ￿x point theorem via retractions (or the non-retraction
5In Scarf (1982), p. 1024, Scarf is more precise about the reasons for the failure of con-
structivity in the proof of Brouwer￿ s ￿x point theorem:
"In order to demonstrate Brouwer￿ s theorem completely we must consider a
sequence of subdivisions whose mesh tends to zero. Each such subdivision will
yield a completely labeled simplex and, as a consequence of the compactness of
the unit simplex, there is a convergent subsequence of completely labeled sim-
plices all of whose vertices tend to a single point x￿. (This is, of course, the
non-constructive step in demonstrating Brouwer￿ s theorem, rather than provid-
ing an approximate ￿xed point)."
There are two points to be noted: ￿rst of all, even here Scarf does not pinpoint quite
precisely to the main culprit for the cause of the non-constructivity in the proof of Brouwer￿ s
theorem; secondly, nothing in the construction of the algorithm provides a justi￿cation to
call the value generated by it to be an approximation to x￿. In fact the value determined by
Scarf￿ s algorithm has no theoretically meaningful connection with x￿ (i.e., to p￿) for it to be
referred to as an approximate equilibrium.
6Just for ease of reading the discussion in this section I state, here, the simplest possible
statement of this theorem:
Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem: Every bounded sequence contains a con-
vergent subsequence
9theorem) essentially unconstructi￿able. Scarf￿ s attempt to discuss the relation-
ship between these two theorems [i.e., between the non-retraction and Brouwer
￿x point theorems] and to interpret [his] combinatorial lemma [on e⁄ectively
labelling a restricted simplex] as an example of the non-retraction theorem is
incongruous. This is because Scarf, too, like the Brouwer at the time of the origi-
nal proof of his ￿x-point theorem, uses the full paraphernalia of non-constructive
logical principles to link the Brouwer and non-retraction theorems and his com-
binatorial lemma7.
The two relevant theorems, in the context of the background provided in this
paper, in Negishi (1960), are theorems 1 & 2. I shall concentrate on Theorem 2
(ibid, p.5), which (I think) is the more important one and the one that came to
play the important role justly attributed to it via the Negishi Research Program
outlined by Young (op.cit)8.
Proposition 3 The Proof of the Existence of Maximising Welfare Weights in
the Negishi Theorem is Nonconstructive
Proof. (Sketch) Negishi￿ s proof relies on satisfying the Slater (Complemen-
tary) Slackness Conditions (Slater, 19509). Slater￿ s proof10 of these conditions
invoke the Kakutani ￿xed point theorem (Theorem 1 in Kakutani, 1941), and
Kakutani￿ s Min-Max Theorem (Theorem 3, ibid). These two theorems, in turn,
invoke Theorem 2 and the Corollary (ibid, p.458), which are based on The-
orem 1 (ibid, p. 457). This latter theorem is itself based on the validity of
the Brouwer ￿xed point theorem, which is not just nonconstructive, but also
non-constructi￿able (cf., Brouwer, 1952).
Proposition 4 The vector of maximising welfare weights, derived in the Negishi
Theorem, is uncomputable
Proof. A straightforward implication of Proposition 1
Discovering the exact nature and source of appeals to nonconstructive modes
of reasoning, appeals to undecidable disjunctions and reliance on nonconstruc-
tive mathematical entities in the formulation of a theorem is a tortuous exercise.
The nature of the pervasive presence of these three elements ￿i.e., nonconstruc-
tive modes of reasoning, primarily the reliance on tertium non datur, undecid-
able disjunctions and nonconstructive mathematical entities ￿in any standard
theorem and its proof, and the di¢ culties of discovering them, is elegantly out-
lined by Fred Richman (1990, p. 125; italics added):
7Scarf uses, in addition, proof by contradiction where, implicitly, LEM (tertium non datur)
is also invoked in the context of an in￿nitary instance (cf. Scarf (1982), pp. 1026-7).
8To demonstrate the nonconstructive elements of Theorem 1 (ibid, p.5), I would need
to include almost a whole tutorial on constructive mathematics to make clear the notion of
compactness that is legitimate in constructive analysis.
9Slater (1950) must easily qualify for inclusion in the class of pioneering articles that
remained forever in the ￿ samizdat￿ status of a Discussion Paper!
10I should add that the applied general equilibrium theorists who use Negishi￿ s method to
￿ compute￿(uncomputable) equilibria do not seem to be fully aware of the implications of some
of the key assumptions in Slater￿ s complementary slackness conditions. That Negishi (1960)
is aware of them is clear from his Assumption 2 and Lemma 1.
10￿Even those who like algorithms have remarkably little appreci-
ation of the thoroughgoing algorithmic thinking that is required for
a constructive proof. This is illustrated by the nonconstructive na-
ture of many proofs in books on numerical analysis, the theoretical
study of practical numerical algorithms. I would guess that most
realist mathematicians are unable even to recognize when a proof is
constructive in the intuitionist￿ s sense.
It is a lot harder than one might think to recognize when a the-
orem depends on a nonconstructive argument. One reason is that
proofs are rarely self-contained, but depend on other theorems whose
proofs depend on still other theorems. These other theorems have of-
ten been internalized to such an extent that we are not aware whether
or not nonconstructive arguments have been used, or must be used,
in their proofs. Another reason is that the law of excluded middle
[LEM] is so ingrained in our thinking that we do not distinguish
between di⁄erent formulations of a theorem that are trivially equiv-
alent given LEM, although one formulation may have a constructive
proof and the other not.￿
These are further reasons to pay close attention to Richman￿ s carefully
spelled out constructive thoughts. For, a supreme mathematical economic the-
orist like Takashi Negishi, who also happens to be mathematically very able,
could use words like ￿ computation￿ , even if referring to application by others
of his theorem(s), in an otherwise wholly nonconstructive setting and not sus-
pect that ￿ proofs are rarely self-contained, but depend on other theorems whose
proofs depend on still other theorems. These other theorems have often been
internalized to such an extent that we are not aware whether or not constructive
arguments have been used, or must be used, in their proofs.￿
4 Concluding Notes
It may be appropriate to conclude this brief exercise with some comments on
the uncomputable and non-constructive underpinnings of the two fundamental
theorems of welfare economics.
The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics asserts that a com-
petitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. The theorem is proved non-constructively,
using an uncomputable equilibrium price vector to compute an equilibrium al-
location. Therefore, the contradiction step in the proof requires a comparison
between an uncomputable allocation and an arbitrary allocation, for which no
computable allocation can be devised. Moreover, the theorem assumes the in-
termediate value theorem in its non-constructive form. Finally, even if the equi-
librium price vector is computable, the contradiction step in the proof invokes
the law of the excluded middle and is, therefore, unacceptable constructively
(because it requires algorithmically undecidable disjunctions to be employed in
the decision procedure).
11The Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem establishes the proposition that
any Pareto optimum can, for suitably chosen prices, be supported as a competi-
tive equilibrium. The role of the Hahn-Banach theorem in this proposition is in
establishing the suitable price system.
The Hahn-Banach theorem does have a constructive version, but only on
subspaces of separable normed spaces. The standard, ￿ classical￿version, valid
on nonseparable normed spaces depends on Zorn￿ s Lemma which is, of course,
equivalent to the axiom of choice, and is therefore, non-constructive11.
Schechter￿ s perceptive comment on the constructive Hahn-Banach theorem is
the precept I wish economists with a numerical, computational or experimental
bent should keep in mind (ibid, p. 135).:
"[O]ne of the fundamental theorems of classical functional analysis
is the Hahn-Banach Theorem; ... some versions assert the existence
of a certain type of linear functional on a normed space X. The
theorem is inherently nonconstructive, but a constructive proof can
be given for a variant involving normed spaces X that are separable
￿i.e., normed spaces that have a countable dense subset. Little is
lost in restricting one￿ s attention to separable spaces12, for in applied
math most or all normed spaces of interest are separable. The con-
structive version of the Hahn-Banach Theorem is more complicated,
but it has the advantage that it actually ￿nds the linear functional
in question."
So, one may be excused for wondering, why economists rely on the ￿ classical￿
versions of these theorems? They are devoid of numerical meaning and compu-
tational content. Why go through the rigmarole of ￿rst formalizing in terms of
numerically meaningless and computationally invalid concepts to then seek im-
possible and intractable approximations to determine uncomputable equilibria,
undecidably e¢ cient allocations, and so on?
Thus my question is: why should an economist force the economic domain
to be a normed vector space? Why not a separable normed vector space? Isn￿ t
this because of unfamiliarity with constructive mathematics and a carelessness
about the nature and scope of fundamental economic entities and the domain
over which they should be de￿ned?
On the other hand, the ￿rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics fails
constructively and computably on three grounds: the dependence on the in-
termediate value theorem (non-constructive), the use of an uncomputable equi-
librium price vector in the proof by contradiction (uncomputability) and the
11This is not a strictly accurate statement, although this is the way many advanced books
on functional analysis tend to present the Hahn-Banach theorem. For a reasonably accessible
discussion of the precise dependency of the Hahn-Banach theorem on the kind of axiom of
choice (i.e., whether countable axiom of choice or the axiom of dependent choice), see Narici
& Beckenstein (1997). For an even better and fuller discussion of the Hahn-Banach theorem,
both from ￿ classical￿and a constructive points of view, Schechter￿ s encyclopedic treatise is
unbeatable (Schechter, 1997)).
12However, it must be remembered that Ishihara, Ishihara (1989), has shown the construc-
tive validity of the Hahn-Banach theorem also for uniformly convex spaces.
12use of the law of the excluded middle in the proof by contradiction (non-
constructivity).
Thus, although I still subscribe to Luenberger￿ s ￿and the general mathe-
matical economics and economic theoretic profession￿ s ￿view that the proof of
existence of equilibrium and the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics
are the ￿ crown jewels￿of the subject, and the two most important mathematical
tools ￿￿xed point theorems and the Hahn-Banach theorem ￿are the pearls of
the subject, I now feel they lose some of their lustre, when viewed computable
and constructively. To that extent the fundamental theorems and methods of
proof of Negishi and Scarf, when invoked in computable contexts or endowed
with constructivity properties, must be used with the care their originators al-
ways bestowed upon them. This care is less rigorously observed by the many
applied economists who, understandably, want to make the theory useful in an
empirical, policy oriented sense, for which the links that these theorems and
methods of proof with the equilibrium existence theorem and the fundamental
theorems of welfare economics are irresistible magnets.
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